We offer an alternative explanation. We posit that the advantages of selling out to a larger organization, which can speed a product to market and realize economies of scope, have increased relative to the benefits of operating as an independent firm. Consistent with this hypothesis, we document that small company IPOs have had declining profitability, consistently low returns for public market investors, and an increasing likelihood of being involved in acquisitions.
Introduction
The number of initial public offerings (IPOs) IPOs this decade has generated much discussion among private company executives, stock exchange officials, policy-makers, and the financial press, as well as among venture capitalists and buyout firms that depend on an active IPO market for exits. Commentators have expressed concern that the lack of a vibrant IPO market could limit Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment growth (e.g., Weild and Kim (2009) ). Delaware Governor Jack Markell, writing in the Wall Street Journal (2012), states "By some estimates, including a study prepared by Grant Thornton LLP, the U.S. has lost more than 10 million jobs because of lost IPOs since the 1990s."
The U.S. Treasury impaneled a task force to examine policy options for generating more IPOs by U.S. companies.
1 Congress has passed bi-partisan legislation to generate more IPOs, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. Settlement (see Weild and Kim (2008, 2009) , as discussed in Zweig (2010) and Weild (2011) ). 3 This explanation asserts that the decline in bid-ask spreads and other regulatory changes have reduced the incentive of market makers to have affiliated analysts cover a stock. This analyst coverage explanation assumes that small company valuation ratios (e.g., price-to-earnings and market-to-book ratios) are higher if there is more analyst coverage (and especially if there is favorable analyst coverage), decreasing the cost of equity capital from public markets. Consistent with the lack of analyst coverage explanation, Jegadeesh and Kim (2010 , Table 1 ) report that both the number of firms covered and the number of sell-side analysts peaked in 2002 and then declined.
We term the above explanations the regulatory overreach hypothesis. All of the above explanations for the low volume of IPOs since 2000 can be summarized as being variants of "the IPO market is broken." Although we do not argue that nothing is wrong with the IPO market, our explanation for the dearth of IPOs in the last decade is fundamentally different.
In this paper, we introduce a new explanation for the prolonged low level of U.S. IPO volume, which we term the economies of scope hypothesis. We posit that there is an on-going change in the economy that has reduced the profitability of small companies, whether public or private. Our analysis is based on the technological determinants of the optimal scale of the firm in a dynamic environment, where profitable growth opportunities may be lost if they are not quickly seized. We contend that many small firms can create greater operating profits by selling out in a trade sale (being acquired by a firm in the same or a related industry) rather than operating as an independent firm. Earnings will be higher as part of a larger organization that can realize economies of scope and bring new technology to market faster. 4 Both the regulatory overreach and the economies of scope hypotheses attribute the drop in the number of small company IPOs to low public market prices relative to their valuations in a trade sale. The conventional wisdom, however, states that the low public market price is due to either a lower valuation caused by the lack of analyst coverage, or to lower earnings as a public firm because of SOX and other costs. In contrast, our explanation is that earnings are higher as part of a larger organization that can realize economies of scope and economies of scale, and this feature is the main reason why many small firms are choosing not to remain independent, but instead merging as a way of getting big fast. If our explanation is correct, regulatory reforms aimed at restoring the IPO ecosystem will have only a modest ability to affect IPO volume.
We present numerous facts that are consistent with our economies of scope hypothesis and inconsistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis. Following concerns that the implementation of SOX, especially Section 404, was imposing excessive costs on small public companies, in June 2007 the SEC revised some of the rules, lessening the burdens on small companies. 5 Inconsistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis, the number of small company IPOs has not increased since then. 4 Economies of scope exist when the average cost of production, including marketing and distribution costs, are lower when related products are produced as part of a larger organization than when produced by independent organizations. For example, a pharmaceutical company that sells two types of antibiotics is likely to have lower costs per unit than if two independent companies each sold one antibiotic. 5 The U.S. SEC released its interpretive guidance on June 27, 2007, and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board approved Auditing Standard No. 5 for public accounting firms on July 25, 2007. On September 15, 2010, the SEC issued final rule 33-9142, which permanently exempts registrants that are neither accelerated nor large accelerated filers from the Section 404(b) internal controls audit requirement.
We show that the drop in IPO volume has been concentrated among small firms, a pattern that has been widely noted. We report that among small firm IPOs, the percentage that are unprofitable in the three years after going public has increased from 58% in 1980-2000 to 73% in 2001-2009 . In contrast, for large company IPOs there has been no downtrend in post-IPO profitability. We also analyze the profitability of small and large Compustat-listed companies that have been public for more than three years, and construct a "what-if" measure of profitability by excluding SOX-related costs from expenses. We find that the pattern of low profitability for small firms persists.
Of companies that do go public in the U.S., we report that there has been no drop in analyst coverage. Furthermore, we present evidence that for the last three decades the long-run returns earned by investors on small company IPOs have been poor, with the relative performance of small company IPOs particularly disappointing after 2000. Taken together, these patterns suggest that while SOX and the combined effects of decimalization and the Global Settlement on analyst coverage may have had some effect on small company IPOs, the more fundamental problems are the absence of profitable small companies and the absence of small companies that grow and become highly profitable, earning high returns for investors.
Inconsistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis, relatively few U.S. firms have chosen to go public abroad (Caglio, Hanley, and Marietta-Westberg (2011, reflecting the increasing importance of economies of scope, and a dummy variable for the post-SOX era, while controlling for business conditions, the profitability of small firms, the market-to-book ratio of small firms, and lagged and future returns on the Nasdaq index. Our economies of scope hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient for the time trend variable. At the same time, the regulatory overreach hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient for the SOX dummy variable.
There are two key empirical findings. First, we obtain a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the time trend, supporting our economies of scope hypothesis. Furthermore, there is a stronger downtrend for small firm IPOs than for large firm IPOs. In contrast, the coefficient on the SOX dummy variable is close to zero and statistically insignificant in all of our specifications.
To the best of our knowledge, our economies of scope hypothesis offers a completely new explanation for the drop in U.S. IPO activity after 2000. Perhaps the closest related paper is by Bayar and Chemmanur (2011) , which models the choice of going public as a tradeoff between an entrepreneur retaining the private benefits of control by staying private versus realizing higher wealth due to economies of scale and scope from the IPO proceeds. Our analysis goes a step further, and hinges on the argument that by selling out rather than going public, the firm is able to achieve even greater economies of scale and scope. Because we are interested in explaining the time series rather than the cross section of IPO activity, we do not focus on private benefits of control, since we are not aware of any reason to think that they have changed over time. Table 6 when we show that the percentage of IPOs from foreign issuers has increased over time. 
The Decline in U.S. IPO Activity

The Profitability of Small and Large Firms
The profitability of publicly traded small and large firms over time
In Table 2 , we report the percentage of publicly traded firms with negative EPS each year from 1980-2009. We report this percentage for small and large company IPOs (columns 2 and 4) from the prior three years, and small and large seasoned firms (columns 6 and 8), which we define as firms that have been CRSP-listed for at least three years. We define small and large IPO firms using a cutoff of $50 million (2009 purchasing power) in pre-IPO last twelve month (LTM)
sales. For seasoned firms, we define small and large firms using a cutoff of $250 million (2009 purchasing power) in annual sales. Our rationale for using different cutoffs for recent IPOs and for seasoned firms is that most IPOs are rapidly growing at the time of the IPO, and many companies that had less than $50 million in sales in the year before going public grow in the years after the IPO to exceed this threshold. Restricting the definition of seasoned firms to a $50 million annual sales cutoff would result in a relatively tiny sample of small seasoned firms, partly consisting of seasoned "loser" firms. Our qualitative conclusions, however, are not sensitive to the exact cutoffs.
Column 2 of Table 2 shows a dramatic decline in the post-issue profitability of recent small company IPOs over time. In every fiscal year from 1980-1991, less than 50% of small company IPOs from the previous three years were unprofitable. By contrast, in every single year since then, more than 50% of small company IPOs from the prior three years have been unprofitable.
In comparison, column 4 of Table 2 shows a modest decline over time in the post-IPO profitability of large company IPOs.
Column 8 of 
Post-IPO profitability categorized by industry
Given that the industry composition of IPOs changes over time, how robust are the patterns documented in Table 2 ? In Table 3 , we categorize IPOs by the pre-issue sales and time period, and report the fraction of IPO firm fiscal years with negative EPS in the three fiscal years after the IPO. In other words, Table 3 sorts firms by IPO year cohort, whereas Table 2 sorted by fiscal years. As we do throughout the paper, we classify small and large company IPOs using $50 million in inflation-adjusted (2009 purchasing power) pre-IPO annual revenue as the cutoff, irrespective of how much money was raised in the IPO and irrespective of the equity market capitalization. For each IPO going public in calendar year t, we then search for the EPS numbers for the first three fiscal years after the IPO, conditional on the first fiscal year ending more than six months after the IPO. 9 We then tabulate the number of fiscal years with either negative or nonnegative EPS.
In Table 3 Additionally, we separately report the frequency of nonnegative and negative EPS for small and large company IPOs, for tech and biotech firms (Panel B of Table 3 ) and firms in all other industries (Panel C of Table 3) . Inspection of the panels shows that the declining profitability of small company IPOs is not entirely driven by tech and biotech firms. The non-tech firms in Panel 9 Our purpose is to show profitability after the IPO, not including fiscal years that had the majority of the months prior to the IPO. C show a smaller, but still downward, trend in profitability.
Overall, we conclude that small company IPOs exhibit declining profitability for both of these broadly defined industry groupings.
Small Company IPOs Underperform in the Long Run
The preceding analysis has documented a decline over time in the profitability of small firms conducting IPOs. We now turn to the post-issue stock return performance of small and large company IPOs, and link it to the economies of scope and regulatory overreach hypotheses. Table 4 tabulates the first-day return and three alternative measures of the three-year buy-and-hold returns after the IPO issue date for all IPOs, small company IPOs, and large company IPOs. Three-year buy-and-hold returns are measured from the closing market price on the first day of trading until the earlier of either their three-year anniversary or their delisting date.
The buy-and-hold abnormal return BHAR i,T for stock i over horizon T is measured both with respect to the CRSP value-weighted index (market-adjusted), and with respect to a seasoned stock that is matched on the basis of market capitalization and its book-to-market ratio (style matching):
where R i,t is the net return in period t on stock i and R i,t is the net return in period t on either the value-weighted market or the style-matched seasoned firm. In addition to reporting the equally weighted unconditional returns in the top row of Table 4 , we also categorize IPOs by the pre-issue sales of the firm and by subperiod.
Inspection of the bottom two rows of Table 4 shows that small company IPOs have underperformed relative to their style-matched benchmark by an average of 17.3% during the three years after going public, whereas large company IPOs have outperformed their style-matched benchmark by 2.6% during the three years after going public. Furthermore, small company IPOs have underperformed their style-matched benchmark in every subperiod. The underperformance relative to the value-weighted market benchmark is even more severe for the small companies, and is also present in every subperiod.
Even The poor long-run performance of small company IPOs, in principle, could be consistent with both the regulatory overreach hypothesis and the economies of scope hypothesis. If a drop in analyst coverage and SOX compliance costs were unanticipated, companies that were already public when these changes occurred would see low returns as investors incorporated the effects into market prices. Table 4 , however, reveals low returns on recent small company IPOs in all subperiods over our 30 year sample period.
The economies of scope hypothesis asserts that technological change has put increasing pressure on the profitability of small firms over a prolonged period of time. The declining profitability of small firms would result in low returns for investors, however, only if the decline in profitability was unanticipated. Irrespective of the cause of the low realized returns on small company IPOs, the low post-issue returns inevitably would dampen investor enthusiasm for small company IPOs, resulting in lower volume.
Analyst Coverage Following IPOs
In Sections 3 and 4, we have documented the poor post-IPO operating performance and low stock returns on small company IPOs. We now examine the validity of one of the arguments underlying the regulatory overreach hypothesis by presenting evidence on analyst coverage following IPOs. As previously discussed, many commentators have argued that a decline in analyst coverage on small companies has deterred small companies from going public.
The IPO ecosystem explanation for the decline of small company IPOs argues that more than just the number of analysts has declined. Independent boutique investment banks such as , Table IV) ).
In Table 5 , we report the frequency of analyst coverage following IPOs. The main source for analyst coverage data is the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) analyst recommendation database (August 2010 download). Since I/B/E/S recommendation data started during 1993, the usable IPO sample in Table 5 report the percentage of firms that have at least one analyst report from any sell-side analyst within the first, second, and third year since the IPO date, respectively. The coverage ratio in the second and third year is calculated conditional on the firm still being CRSP-listed at the start of the respective year. The overall time series pattern in Table 5 suggests that there is little change in the propensity to receive analyst coverage over time.
The relatively lower coverage ratios observed in 1994 and 1995 are more likely due to incomplete data in I/B/E/S rather than a lack of analyst coverage in the earlier years. During Lastly, it is worth noting that for almost all cohorts, a lower percentage of the surviving IPOs are covered in year 2 than year 1, and in year 3 than in year 2. Partly this reflects a pattern that as a company becomes more seasoned, it is either succeeding and thus generating interest from institutional investors (and thus sell-side analysts), or it is failing and generating less interest from institutional investors and analysts. In general, both the probability of adding additional analysts covering the firm and the probability of becoming an "orphan" with no coverage grows. Most importantly, for year 3 analyst coverage, there is no evidence of a downtrend in column 5 of Table 5 for either small company or large company IPOs, suggesting that of the companies that do go public, the risk of being abandoned by analysts within a few years of going public has not increased.
In sum, our empirical results indicate no decline in post-IPO analyst coverage.
Consequently, a lack of analyst coverage is not a plausible major cause of the decline in IPO volume.
Has Sarbanes-Oxley Driven Away IPOs?
This section assesses the impact of SOX on both U.S. IPOs as well as foreign IPOs, shedding further light on the relevance of the regulatory overreach hypothesis.
Are firms made worse off by Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs?
Section 404 of SOX has received widespread criticism for imposing large costs on small public firms, and, since 2007, the SEC approved several delays to allow the smallest public firms to postpone their compliance with Section 404(b), before permanently exempting them on September 15, 2010 (SEC final rule #33-9142). The critics of SOX have rarely noted its purpose, however. Assume that investors require a 10% expected return, and that there are 100 stocks with, between them, $9,950 million in earnings and zero growth. Further assume that 99 of the stocks earn $100 million per year, and one earns $50 million per year but engages in accounting fraud and reports $100 million. Rational investors will value these stocks at an aggregate of $99.5 billion. In a rational market, investors will value each of these stocks at a price-to-earnings ratio of 9.95 rather than 10.00, with 99 of them being undervalued by $5 million each and one of them overvalued by $495 million.
If each of these companies could demonstrate that its earnings number was accurate at a cost of $400,000 per year, the 99 honest companies would do so and report profits of $99.6 million each ($100 million minus the compliance costs), and rational investors would value these companies at $996 million each rather than $995 million. Rational investors would realize that the one other company was not having its earnings certified, and would not value it at the average of the other companies.
With the assumptions above, 99% of companies are net beneficiaries of SOX because it has removed the bad apple from the barrel, allowing the good apples to get a higher price rather than a pooling price. If the cost of compliance was increased to $600,000, however, then all of the firms would receive a lower valuation because the pooling price is higher than the market price net of compliance costs. Depending on the costs of compliance and how many bad apples are removed from the barrel, the net effects can go either way. Furthermore, if there are fixed costs of compliance, the direct costs of compliance will be a higher proportion of profits for smaller firms, and unless the fraction of bad apples is sufficiently higher among small firms, the net benefits are likely to be lower for small companies than big companies. Iliev (2010 Iliev ( , p. 1163 estimates the costs of compliance, and concludes that "On net, SOX compliance reduced the market value of small firms."
Since 2002, firms have had to pay SOX compliance costs. If the costs of complying with SOX are sufficiently onerous that small firms are on net made worse off, the decline in small company IPOs this decade can be partly attributed to SOX. In Figure 2 , we plot the percentages of small and large seasoned firms with negative EPS, as reported in columns 6 and 8 of Table 2 .
As can be seen, the downtrend in small company profitability began before SOX.
Would there be more small firms with positive profits in the post-SOX period if SOX-related costs had not boosted the expenses of publicly traded companies? To address this question, we construct an alternative series of the percentage of profitable firms by assuming after-tax SOX compliance costs of $650,000 per small firm and $2,536,000 per big firm, dividing this number by the number of shares outstanding, and adding this back into EPS. 11 For 11 Iliev (2010 Iliev ( , p. 1166 ) uses a regression discontinuity approach and estimates that in 2004 small firms had additional pre-tax audit costs of $697,890. Figure 2 , we then show, for 2002 and later, the percentage of small (and big) firms that would be profitable if they didn't incur the extra SOX costs.
We find the effect of paying the compliance cost on the profitability for small firms to be limited. Adding the compliance cost back removes between 43 and 76 small firms' EPS from the negative EPS category each year. This only removes about 4% to 5% of the small firms from the negative EPS group. The black dotted line of Figure 2 shows that without paying any SOX compliance costs, the firms' profitability would be improved. It would still be the case, however, that for the small seasoned firms, 40% or more of them would report negative EPS.
The effect of SOX on foreign listings
Many commentators have expressed concern over the decline in the relative importance of moderate-size firms, the mean reported costs are $1,168,319 and $1,082,814, respectively. For the large firms, the mean reported costs are $4,308,413 and $3,633,421, respectively. The $650,000 and $2,536,000 numbers that we use are weighted averages of, respectively, the pre-, post-, and next-means in Panel A for small firms, and Panels B and C for big firms, of If SOX is an important reason for why companies, especially small companies, are not listing in the U.S., we might observe many U.S. companies going public abroad. In contrast, if U.S. companies are not going public because the advantage of being an independent firm has declined relative to becoming a part of a larger organization, then we would not see a substitution of U.S. companies going public in foreign markets rather than the U.S. Lucchetti (2011) Our hypothesis that small firms are not going public in the U.S. because the advantage of being a small independent firm has fallen applies to other countries as well. Consistent with this hypothesis, Caglio, Hanley, and Marietta-Westberg (2011, In Table 6 , we report the percentage of foreign companies, including those using ADRs, going public among U.S. IPOs each year from 1988-2011. To summarize, the evidence in our Table 6 and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009, 2011) does not suggest that the lower number of IPOs in the U.S. in recent years is because either U.S.
or foreign firms are fleeing U.S. markets in favor of foreign markets.
Evidence from Post-IPO Mergers
If our hypothesis that the value of small independent firms has declined relative to the value of larger firms is true, we would expect more private firms to sell out in trade sales and, for those companies that do go public, a higher propensity to be involved in a merger as either an acquirer or a target. If a lack of analyst coverage and high SOX compliance costs are instead the predominant reason for why being a small publicly traded firm has become less attractive, we would expect an increase in the last decade in the fraction of recent IPOs that subsequently go private. Alternatively, if being small is the issue, rather than being public, we would expect to see an increase in the number of small companies selling out to strategic buyers. hypothesis that small firms must grow fast to realize economies of scale and scope.
Our hypothesis that the reduction in small company IPOs is at least partly due to an increase in economies of scale and scope produces a further testable cross-sectional implication. If the changes in economies of scale and scope are bigger in some industries than others, we predict that there should be more M&A activity in those industries with a bigger increase. To test this implication, we would need industry definitions and measures of which industries have seen the greatest increase in the importance of economies of scope. Because increased merger activity might mean a higher propensity to sell out in a trade sale prior to an IPO, the cross-sectional prediction for IPO volume is less clear. In any case, we leave the testing of this implication for future work.
We can summarize the evidence in the above-mentioned studies of post-IPO acquisitions and our Table 7 as showing that a large, and increasing, fraction of firms that do go public merge, either as a target or an acquirer. Rather than depending on organic growth, these firms speed up the process of achieving economies of scale and economies of scope through mergers. Combined with the evidence in our other tables, it appears that the attractiveness of being a publicly traded small independent firm has noticeably declined, strengthening the case for the economies of scope hypothesis. Inconsistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis, there has been no increase in the fraction of recent IPOs that subsequently go private as an independent firm.
Time-series Regressions Explaining Scaled IPO Activity
So far, we have presented univariate evidence consistent with our hypothesis that the increasing importance of economies of scope and speed in bringing products to market is an important determinant of the decline in IPOs, particularly among small firm IPOs. In this section, we conduct time-series regressions using scaled quarterly IPO activity as the dependent variable.
Our goal is to show that, after controlling for other determinants of IPO volume, there has been a long-term downward trend in IPO volume rather than an abrupt decline after 2000. Specifically, the economies of scope hypothesis predicts a long-term steady decline in IPO volume, especially for small company IPOs, whereas the regulatory overreach hypothesis predicts a discrete drop after SOX was implemented.
For this purpose, we estimate the following regression where we use four measures of IPO Table 3 regressions using 1972-1996 data. of the time trend is also statistically significant and negative. This finding suggests that small firm IPOs exhibit a stronger downward trend than large firm IPOs, in line with our hypothesis that the increased importance of economies of scale and scope exert a greater adverse impact on small firm IPOs. This result is further corroborated by the absence of a statistically significant time trend among large firm IPOs (Model 3).
Inconsistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis, the SOX dummy is never statistically significant in the presence of the time trend and our control variables. For instance, for Models 2 and 4, the estimates of the SOX dummy are 0.08 and -0.05, with t-statistics of 0.05 and -0.69, respectively. Such a finding compliments our evidence in Table 6 regarding international listings and the Figure 2 evidence on profitability changes, which suggest that the impact of SOX is insufficiently large to account for the observed decline in IPO volume.
In sum, the regression evidence is supportive of the economies of scope hypothesis. In particular, the negative time trend estimates support our argument that the increasing importance of economies of scope and speed is a driver of the decline in IPO volume since 2000, especially for small firms, suggesting that small firms are particularly vulnerable to changes in technology.
Ruling Out Explanations Linked to Litigation Risk and Public Market Valuations
Litigation risk
Additional explanations for the decline in IPO activity beyond those that we have discussed have been offered by Angel (2011) 15 Thus, we are unable to find evidence that increased litigation risk has had a greater deterrent effect on potential IPOs in recent years than in the 1990s.
Public market valuations
Many articles have documented that there are more IPOs when public market valuations are high (e.g., Lerner (1994, Figure 1) and Lowry (2003, Tables 3 and 4) ). This "valuation" view generates the prediction that IPO volume will recover to the lofty levels of the 1980s and 1990s
if and when public equity market valuations recover to their previous peaks. The Nasdaq index peaked at over 5,000 in March 2000 and, as of March 2012, has not been much above 3,000 since then. Part of the high volume of IPOs in the late 1990s could thus be attributable to unsustainably high market valuations that were given to technology stocks. It should be noted that although valuations peaked in 2000, there were many more small companies going public in 1986 and 1992-1996 than in 1999-2000. In our Table 8 time-series regressions, our controls for valuation levels have the predicted signs, but are unable to explain much of the variation in IPO volume. Thus, the paucity of IPOs during the last decade cannot be attributed merely to temporarily depressed stock market valuations.
Conclusions
Although the gross proceeds raised in U.S. IPOs this decade has not precipitously declined, the number of IPOs, especially the number of small company IPOs, has fallen. During Settlement have reduced the attractiveness of being public for small companies, we argue that the more fundamental problem is the deterioration in the profitability of small companies.
We posit that there has been a fundamental change in many sectors of the economy whereby the importance of bringing products to market quickly has increased. This hypothesized change has resulted in lower profits for independent small companies relative to the potential profits generated as part of a larger organization that can realize economies of scope and rapidly expand production. If this explanation is correct, fewer firms are going public and staying independent because value is being created in a sale to a strategic buyer in the same or related industry.
We report that among small company IPOs, the percentage of firms reporting negative profits in the three years after the IPO has increased from an average of 58% in 1980-2000 to 73% in 2001-2009 . Furthermore, the post-IPO abnormal returns earned by investors on small company IPOs have been low, underperforming a style benchmark by an average of 17.3% in the three years after going public, compared to outperformance of 2.6% for large company IPOs. Of those companies that do go public, many are subsequently involved in M&A deals, either as a target or an acquirer, or both. The evidence is consistent with an environment of "eat or be eaten," where slow organic growth as an independent company is less attractive than quickly achieving economies of scope via being acquired.
In addition to providing univariate evidence supporting our economies of scope hypothesis, If we are right, regulatory changes aimed at increasing the number of IPOs are likely to have minor effects, since the decline in IPOs is not due to a broken IPO market, but because small independent companies are not necessarily the profit-maximizing form of organization.
Consequently, U.S. capital markets are unlikely to see a resurrection of IPO volume to the levels that were common in the 1980s and 1990s. Even more important from a public policy perspective, if our economies of scope hypothesis is correct, encouraging small firms to remain independent rather than realize greater value as part of a larger organization might harm the economy. Table 1 selection criteria are used, with buy-and-hold returns calculated from the first CRSP-reported closing price through the earlier of the third year anniversary of the IPO, the delisting date, or December 31, 2010. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are defined in equation (1) in the text. The sample size is 7,439 firms (four IPOs that are included in other tables have been deleted because they were actually REITs or a follow-on). Small and large company IPOs are defined on the basis of whether the pre-IPO last twelve months sales are less than or greater than $50 million (using 2009 purchasing power based on the CPI). Market-adjusted returns use the CRSP value-weighted index. Style adjustments use firms matched by market cap and book-to-market ratio with at least five years of CRSP listing and no follow-on equity issues in the prior five years. For post-book values we use the post-issue common equity numbers from the Thomson Reuters new issues database with corrections that rely on the prospectus. For the remaining missing numbers we use the equity book values reported for the nearest quarter after the IPO on COMPUSTAT, and further missing numbers are calculated using the reported pre-IPO equity book values plus the amount of the proceeds (assuming that overallotment option shares and costs of issuing offset each other) times the fraction of primary shares in the IPO. If the post-issue book value is still missing (approximately 1% of IPOs), we use the market-adjusted return as the style-adjusted return. For dual-class shares, the post-issue book-to-market ratio is calculated using the larger of the post-issue number of shares reported from Thomson Reuters (with corrections to account for all share classes) and the total shares outstanding reported from CRSP. All returns include dividends and capital gains, including the index returns. 20 firms with missing pre-IPO sales are assumed to have sales of less than $50 million. reports the percentage of IPOs in cohort year t that has at least one analyst report by a lead underwriter by the end of the first year after the issue date. "% covered in year 1" counts the percentage of IPOs that have at least one analyst report from any source by the end of the first year after the issue date. "% covered in year 2" counts the percentage of IPOs that have at least one analyst report in I/B/E/S in the second year after the issue, conditional on the IPO firm surviving into the second year. "% covered in year 3" is defined similarly as "% covered in year 2". To mitigate the concern that I/B/E/S analyst coverage data is incomplete, we collect the I/B/E/S EPS forecast data on IPOs. If there is no recommendation but if an analyst made an earnings forecast for a firm, we assume that the analyst also covered the firm. Table 7 Acquisitions and Buyouts of Recent IPOs, 1980 IPOs, -2009 In this table, we merge our IPO database with the CRSP delisting file and the target firms in the Thomson Reuters (SDC) M&A database. The delisting file gives us the delisting date and the M&A file gives us information on the identity of the acquirers. We classify M&A deals via the following screens. First, the SDC M&A deal has to be completed with an effective date after the IPO date. The effective date must be within 200 calendar days before or after the CRSP delisting date. Second, the delisted IPO must have an effective date of being acquired that is no longer than 3 years after the IPO date. This leaves us with 819 M&A deals targeting IPO firms in both the CRSP delisting and SDC M&A databases. Third, we identify each deal by searching SDC, CRSP, Compustat, Bloomberg, Wikipedia and other sources to classify acquirers into four categories: 1) strategic and public, 2) strategic and private, 3) financial and public, and 4) financial and private.
IPO
In Panel A, if the deal is identified as a leveraged buyout (LBO) and the acquirer is a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), then the deal is labeled as financial and public. Two kinds of acquirers are classified as financial and private. If the deal is identified as an LBO and the acquirer is not a SPAC, the deal is classified as financial and private. If the deal is not an LBO, and the deal type is classified as going private in SDC and the acquisition name is identified as a private company, usually whose name includes "LP", "LLC", or "acquisition", the deal is identified as financial and private. The rest of the deals are identified as strategic. For the strategic deals, if the acquirer is a public company, listed in the US or overseas, or is a subsidiary of a public company, then it is strategic and public. Otherwise, it is classified as strategic and private. For the strategic buyer, if the acquirer is an investor group, we classify the deal as public if at least half of the investors we can identify are public, otherwise it is classified as private. For the 92 IPOs that are identified by CRSP as delisted for non-distress reasons but are not in the SDC M&A database, we search EDGAR and other sources and identify one deal as financial and private and the other 91 as strategic and public. The Percentage of Strategic Buyers includes both public and private strategic buyers.
In Panel B, we categorize IPOs into small and large company IPOs based on their pre-IPO last twelve months sales ($2009). Based on CRSP delisting codes, all companies that were either acquired by a strategic buyer or by a buyout firm are classified as mergers, since buyout firms typically set up an acquisition vehicle to merge the public company into. In each year, the percentage of small and large companies with negative EPS are reported. The black solid line is for small companies and the dashed line is for large companies. Beginning in 2002, for each firm we add SOX costs per share back and recalculate the percentage of firms that would have been unprofitable without the SOX costs, and report these percentages as the dotted lines. Based upon the numbers in Table 9 of the S.E.C.'s 2009 Office of Economic Analysis report, we add back $650,000 and $2,536,000 (2009 purchasing power) to the firm's earnings for, respectively, small and large seasoned firms. These values are after-tax amounts, thus we are implicitly assuming that firms with negative reported earnings are in a zero marginal tax bracket before these costs are added back.
